In 2002, the National Security Council recognized the change in our greatest threat to the nation and prepared the first comprehensive strategy to limit the dangers and anthrax laced letters sent to the federal government and media in the following weeks, the United States prepared its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The stated objective of this strategy is to, . . . not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. We must accord the highest priority to the protection of the United States, our forces, and our friends and allies from the existing and growing WMD threat.
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By establishing such a broad aim, the president afforded the government maximum flexibility in devising a strategy to meet this vital national interest. In September 2008, the Partnership for a Secure America released their bipartisan report of the Unites States' efforts to improve security from WMD attacks. They gave the U.S. Government an overall grade of 'C'. In their report, they identify three major shortfalls the government must address: no one is overall in charge of converting "resolve into results," there is no strategic plan to link disparate actions, and a failure to build international support. 18 They further expound on these areas in three separate reports for chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. States' resolve with regard to stopping the spread of biological weapons. 23 Given that the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest existential threat to the continued existence of the nation, the significant effort focused into this arena is reasonable. Of particular note, the United States has made great strides in securing and destroying Russian nuclear warheads, while simultaneously reemploying Russian scientists. However, the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy have often been working at cross-purposes due to a lack of coordination and supervision. 24 This need for improved unity of effort is not a newly identified fault but rather one that the government continues to fail to address. Brian Finlay, in his Nuclear Threat report for the Partnership for a Secure America, points out three efforts dating back to 1997 directed at rectifying the lack of coordination. In all three cases, PSI, the Global Partnership, and UNSCR 1540, we saw great levels of initial enthusiasm and action. However, while the Bush Administration's support around the world waned, so did their ability to carry forth with additional diplomatic efforts.
Recommendations
While it is clear, the United States Government has done much in the last seven years to protect the nation from Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is clear that there is still more to do. In attempting to create a comprehensive approach several seams have been created that must be addressed, efforts have overlapped leading to wasted dollars and time, and opportunities have been lost internationally. I recommend six areas the government must address in order to achieve the nation's desired end state.
Improve Oversight And Integration. The current efforts to integrate all elements of national power across the interagency must be overhauled. The Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense IPC must be empowered to require supporting strategies, similar to the National Military Strategy, from critical departments.
These include the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Defense, Energy, and Justice. Two key aspects of preparing these strategies are first, they should be coordinated with the other departments and secondly, they should include all of the elements of national power. By requiring coordination, not only will gaps and overlapping efforts become apparent, but also equally important the departments will be able to recognize where they can assist each other. Many of the departments will quickly point out that there are elements of national power they cannot influence, for instance, the Department of Defense and the economic element of power.
While this is true, by addressing all elements and reviewing the other agencies strategies, each department will have a better understanding of how they can integrate their signals and actions.
Closely linked with this are added responsibilities for the Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense IPC. They must quickly establish priorities and timelines to close previously identified gaps. Some examples would include increasing international efforts to detect nuclear material before it arrives in the United
States, improving early detection capabilities for infectious diseases, implementing of a policy to protect critical chemical industrial facilities, and tracking of toxic chemical shipments. 32 Once this plan of action is implemented they must monitor the actions on a routine basis, both measuring success and failure. This will allow our government to capitalize on our successes, identify new opportunities, and fix problems before we waste too many resources. They can easily model this process on the system the European Union has been using since June 2004 to manage their efforts. This includes publicly released reports on a semi-annual basis. 33 By adding transparency to the process, we reinforce to the American people the actions have been taken and clearly communicate to our adversaries that we serious about our resolve.
WMD Taxonomy. One aspect that needs clearing up in this strategic update is that threats in fact fall into seven categories ( Internationally Led Efforts. As has been pointed out, international bodies that the United States can leverage to meet its needs are currently leading numerous efforts.
Additionally, the international community sees the European powers as more diplomatically focused than the United States. Therefore, we should support initiatives the European Union is already making in the realm of both nuclear and chemical non- By reviewing our policy, those areas that are working well can be reinforced and areas requiring improvement can be effectively addressed. In doing so, the White House needs to take substantive steps to follow through on counter-proliferation and consequence management efforts already underway, close policy gaps, bring a synchronized whole of government approach to the strategy, reinvigorate diplomatic efforts, and manage strategic execution. By doing this we will regain necessary international momentum and make true progress in safeguarding our population. A failure to take the next step with the strategy will leave the United States vulnerable both now and in the future.
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